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Abstract
We consider the problem of determining a sequence of payments among a set of
entities that clear (if possible) the liabilities among them. We formulate this as an
optimal control problem, which is convex when the objective function is, and therefore
readily solved. For this optimal control problem, we give a number of useful and
interesting convex costs and constraints that can be combined in any way for different
applications. We describe a number of extensions, for example to handle unknown
changes in cash and liabilities, to allow bailouts, to find the minimum time to clear the
liabilities, or to minimize the number of non-cleared liabilities, when fully clearing the
liabilities is impossible.
1 Introduction
Large, complex networks of liabilities are the foundation of modern financial systems. Ac-
cording to the FDIC, there were on the order of five thousand FDIC-insured banks in the
United States at the end of 2019 [Fed19]. Each of these banks owe each other money as a
result of bank transfers, loans, and securities issued. Inter-bank settlement is handled today
by simple payment systems like Fedwire and CHIPS [BH12, §2.4]. Another example of com-
plex liability networks are derivatives exchanges and brokerages, where there are liabilities
between clients in the form of derivatives contracts or borrowed shares. A goal shared by
all of the entities in these systems is to clear or remove liabilities, which reduces risk and
complexity. Each system has its own goals and constraints in its mission to clear liabilities,
which must be accounted for.
We consider the general problem of liability clearing, which is to determine a sequence of
payments between a set of financial entities to clear (if possible) the liabilities among them
over a finite time horizon. We first observe that the dynamics in liability clearing are linear,
and describe methods that can be used to remove cycles of liability before any payments
are made. We then formulate liability clearing as an optimal control problem with convex
objectives and constraints, where the system’s state is the cash held by each entity and
the liabilities between each entity, and the input to the system is the payments made by
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each entity to other entities. This formulation has several benefits. First, we can naturally
incorporate the goals and constraints in liability clearing in the stage cost function of our
optimal control problem. Second, we can efficiently (globally) solve the problem since it is
convex. Third, domain specific languages for convex optimization make it easy to prototype
new liability clearing mechanisms.
We also extend our formulation to the case where there are exogenous unknown inputs
to the dynamics, which represent uncertain future liabilities or cash flows. We propose a
solution method based on model predictive control, or shrinking horizon control, which, at
each time step, predicts the future unknown inputs, plans a sequences of payments, and then
uses just the first of those payments for the next time period. We then illustrate our method
on several simulated numerical examples, comparing to a simple pro-rata payment baseline.
At the end of the paper, we discuss extensions and variations of our problem, e.g., allowing
bailouts, finding the minimum time to clear a set of liabilities, non-time-separable costs,
infinite time liability control, and how to minimize the number of non-cleared liabilities.
Outline. In §2 we discuss related work as well as its relation to our paper. In §3 we set
out our notation, and describe the dynamics equations and constraints. In §4 we formulate
liability clearing as a convex optimal control problem, and describe a number of useful and
interesting convex costs and constraints. In §5 we extend the optimal control formulation
to the case where the dynamics are subject to additional uncontrollable exogenous terms,
and propose a standard method called model predictive control for this problem. In §6
we illustrate the methods described in this paper by applying them to several numerical
examples. In §7 we conclude with a number of extensions and variations on our formulation.
2 Related work
The liability clearing problem was originally proposed by Eisenberg and Noe in 2001 [EN01].
Their formulation involves determining a single set of payments to be made between the
entities, in contrast to ours, which assumes a sequence of payments are made. Their for-
mulation assumes that these payments can be financed immediately by payments received,
whereas we make the realistic financing constraint that entities cannot pay other entities
more than the cash they have on hand. (This means that it may take multiple steps to clear
liabilities.) In this way, our formulation can be viewed as a supply chain with cash as the
commodity [BV18, §9.5], while their formulation can be viewed as a network flow problem
[HR55], where cash can travel multiple steps through the network at once.
They also make the assumption that all liabilities have equal priority [EN01, §2.2], i.e.,
each entity makes payments proportional to its liabilities to the other entities (we call this
a pro-rata constraint; see §4.2). This means that instead of choosing a matrix of payments
between all the entities, they only need to choose a vector of payments made by the entities;
the payments are then distributed according to the proportion of liability (they call this
vector the clearing vector). Our formulation can include the constraint that payments are
made in proportion to liability, but we observe that enforcing this constraint at each step is
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not the most efficient strategy for clearing liabilities (see §4.5). Because we can incorporate
arbitrary (convex) costs and constraints, our formulation is more flexible and realistic.
Eisenberg and Noe’s original liability clearing formulation has been extended in multiple
ways to include, e.g., default costs and rescue [RV13], cross-holdings [Els09, §2], claims of
different seniority [Els09, §6], fire sales [CFS05], multiple assets [Fei19], and has been used
to answer fundamental questions about contagion in and shocks to large financial networks
[GY15, FRW17]. The extension of our methods to a couple of these cases is described
in §7, The sensitivity of clearing vectors to liabilities has also been analyzed, using implicit
differentiation [FPR+18] and the Farkas lemma [KP19]. Using the techniques of differentiable
convex optimization solution maps [AAB+19], we can perform similar sensitivity analysis
of our liability control problems. Another tangential but related problem is modeling of
liquidity risk and funding runs; of particular note here are the the Diamond and Dybvig
model of bank runs [DD83] and the Allen and Gale model of interbank lending [AG00] (see,
e.g., [GY15, §4] for a survey).
Eisenberg and Noe’s formulation has also been extended to multiple periods. Capponi and
Chen proposed a multi-period clearing framework with a lender of last resort (i.e., bailouts,
see §7.1) and exogenous liabilities and cash flows (see §5.2), and proposed a number of
heuristic policies for controlling risk [CC15]. However, their formulation does not include
the financing constraint, meaning liabilities can be (if possible) cleared in one step; their
focus is more on cash injection and defaults. Other related works include an extension to
continuous time [BBF18], incorporation of multiple maturities and insolvency law [KV19],
incorporation of contingent payments [BF19], and an infinite-time treatment [BFVY19].
3 Notation and dynamics
In this section we set out our notation, and describe the dynamics equations and constraints.
Entities and cash held. We consider a financial system with n financial entities or agents,
such as banks, which we refer to as entities 1, . . . , n. These entities make payments to each
other over discrete time periods t = 1, . . . , T , where T is the time horizon. The time periods
could be any length of time, e.g., each time period could represent a business day. We let
ct ∈ Rn+ denote the cash held by each of the entities, with (ct)i being the amount held by
entity i in dollars at time period t. If the entities are banks, then the cash held is the bank’s
reserves, i.e., physical cash and deposits at the central bank. If the entities are individuals
or corporations, then the cash held is the amount of deposits at their bank.
Liability matrix. Each entity has liabilities or obligations to the other entities, which
represent promised future payments. We represent these liabilities by the liability matrix
Lt ∈ Rn×n+ , where, at time period t, (Lt)ij is the amount in dollars that entity i owes entity
j [EN01, §2.2]. We will assume that (Lt)ii = 0, i.e., the entities do not owe anything to
themselves. Note that Lt1 ∈ Rn+ is the vector of total liabilities of the entities, i.e., (Lt1)i is
the total amount that entity i owes the other entities, in time period t, where 1 is the vector
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with all entries one. Similarly, LTt 1 ∈ Rn+ is the vector of total amounts owed to the entities
by others, i.e., (LTt 1)i is the total amount owed to entity i by the others. The net liability
of the entities at time period t is Lt1−LTt 1, i.e., (Lt1−LTt 1)i is the net liability of entity i.
When (Lt)ij = 0, we say that the liability between entity i and j is cleared (in time period
t). The scalar quantity 1TLt1 is the total gross liability between all the entities. When it is
zero, which occurs only when Lt = 0, all liabilities between the entities have been cleared.
Payment matrix. At each time step, each entity makes cash payments to other entities.
We represent these payments by the payment matrix Pt ∈ Rn×n+ , t = 1, . . . , T − 1, where
(Pt)ij is the amount in dollars that entity i pays entity j in time period t. We assume
that (Pt)ii = 0, i.e., entities do not pay themselves. Thus Pt1 ∈ Rn+ is the vector of total
payments made by the entities to others in time period t, i.e., (Pt1)i is the total cash paid
by entity i to the others. The vector P Tt 1 ∈ Rn+ is the vector of total payments received by
the entities from others in time period t, i.e., (P Tt 1)i is the total payment received by entity
i from the others. Each entity can pay others no more than the cash that it has on hand, so
we have the constraint
Pt1 ≤ ct, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (1)
where the inequality is meant elementwise.
Dynamics. The liability and cash follow the linear dynamics
Lt+1 = Lt − Pt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (2)
ct+1 = ct − Pt1 + P Tt 1, t = 1, . . . , T − 1. (3)
The first equation says that the liability is reduced by the payments made, and the second
says that the cash is reduced by the total payments and increased by the total payments
received.
These dynamics can be extended to include an interest rate for cash, as well as additional
cash flows into and out of the entities, and additional liabilities among the entities. For
simplicity, we continue with the simple dynamics (2) and (3) above, and describe some of
these extensions in §7.
Monotonicity of liabilities. Since Lt ≥ 0, these dynamics imply that
Pt ≤ Lt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (4)
i.e., each entity cannot pay another entity more than its liability. We also observe that
Lt+1 ≤ Lt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (5)
where the inequality is elementwise, which means that each liability is non-increasing in
time. We conclude that if the liability of entity i to entity j is cleared in time period t, it will
remain cleared for all future time periods. In other words, the sparsity pattern (i.e., which
entries are nonzero) of Lt can only not increase over time. The inequality (4) implies that
once a liability between entries has cleared, no further payments will be made. This tells us
that the sparsity patterns of Pt and Lt are no larger than the sparsity pattern of L1.
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Net worth. The net worth of each entity at the beginning of time period t is the cash it
holds minus the total amount it owes others, plus the total amount owed to it by others, or
wt = ct − Lt1 + LTt 1,
where wt ∈ Rn+ is the vector of net worth of the entities. (The second and third terms are
the negative net liability.) The net worth is an invariant under the dynamics, since
wt+1 = ct+1 − Lt+11 + LTt+11,
= ct − Pt1 + P Tt 1− (Lt − Pt)1 + (Lt − Pt)T1,
= ct − Lt1 + LTt 1,
= wt.
Default. If (w1)i < 0, i.e., the initial net worth of entity i is negative, then it will have to
default; it cannot reduce its net liability to zero. If an entity defaults, then it will find itself
unable to fully pay the entities it owes money to, which might cause those entities to default
as well. Such a situation is called a default cascade [EN01, §2.4].
3.1 Liability cycle removal
Graph interpretation. The liabilities between the entities can be interpreted as a weighted
directed graph, where the nodes represent the entities, and the directed edges represent li-
abilities between entities, with weights given by the liabilities. In this interpretation, the
liability matrix is simply the weighted adjacency matrix.
Liability cycle removal. Some of the liabilities between entities can be reduced or re-
moved without the need to make payments between them. This happens when there are
one or more liability cycles. A liability cycle is a cycle in the graph described above, or a
sequence of positive liabilities that starts and ends at the same entity and does not visit
an entity more than once. If there is a liability cycle, then each liability in the cycle can
be reduced by the smallest liability present in the cycle, which reduces at least one of the
liabilities in the cycle to zero (which therefore breaks the cycle). Removing a liability cycle
in this manner keeps the net liabilities of each entity, Lt1 − LTt 1, constant. The simplest
case occurs with a cycle of length two: If (Lt)ij and (Lt)ji are both positive, i.e., entities i
and j each owe the other some positive amount, then we can replace these liabilities with
(Lt)ij −min{(Lt)ij, (Lt)ji}, (Lt)ji −min{(Lt)ij, (Lt)ji},
which will reduce one of the two liabilities (the one that was originally smaller) to zero.
Given a liability matrix L, we give two ways to remove liability cycles, a greedy algorithm
and a formulation of the problem as a linear program. This problem is referred to in the
literature as portfolio compression [DR17, SS19, Ver19] and payment netting [Sha78, O’K14,
O’K17].
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Greedy cycle clearing algorithm. The greedy cycle clearing algorithm begins by search-
ing for a liability cycle, which can be done using a topological sort [Kah62]. If there are no
liability cycles, the algorithm terminates. On the other hand, if there is a liability cycle, the
algorithm reduces each liability in the cycle by the smallest liability present in the cycle,
thus removing the cycle. This process is repeated until there are no more liability cycles.
This algorithm was first proposed in 2009 in a patent filed by TriOptima [Bro09], a portfolio
compression company owned by the CME group that has reported clearing over 1000 trillion
dollars of liabilities through 2017.
Optimal cycle clearing via linear programming. The greedy algorithm described
above can be improved upon if our goal is not to just remove cycles, but also to remove as
much total gross liability as possible. The problem is to find a new liability matrix L˜ ≤ L
with the smallest total gross liability, subject to the constraint that the net liabilities remains
the same. This can be accomplished by solving the linear program
minimize 1T L˜1
subject to L1− LT1 = L˜1− L˜T1,
0 ≤ L˜ ≤ L.
(6)
with variable L˜.
To the best knowledge of the authors, the linear programming formulation of this problem
was first proposed by Shapiro in 1978 [Sha78]. In his formulation, he incorporated transaction
costs by making the objective Tr(CT (L− L˜)) for a given transaction cost matrix C ∈ Rn×n+ .
Other objectives are possible, e.g., the sum of the squared liabilities [O’K14, §3.3].
Liability cycle removal could be carried out before the payments have begun. From (5),
this implies that no cycles would appear; that is, Lt would contain no cycles for t = 1, . . . , T .
We note however that the methods described in this paper work regardless of whether there
are cycles, or whether liability cycle removal has been carried out; that is, liability cycle
removal is optional for the methods described in this paper.
4 Liability control
4.1 Optimal control formulation
We now formulate the problem of finding a suitable sequence of payments that clear (or at
least reduce) the liabilities among the entities as a convex optimal control problem. Given an
initial liability matrix Linit and cash cinit, the liability control problem is to choose a sequence
of payments P1, . . . , PT−1 so as to minimize a sum of stage costs,
T−1∑
t=1
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) + gT (cT , LT ), (7)
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where the function gt : R
n
+×Rn×n+ ×Rn×n+ → R∪{+∞} is the (possibly time-varying) stage
cost, and gT : R
n
+ ×Rn×n+ → R ∪ {+∞} is the terminal stage cost.
Infinite values of the stage cost gt (or gT ) are used to express constraints on ct, Lt, or Pt.
To impose the constraint (ct, Lt, Pt) ∈ Ct, we define gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = +∞ for (ct, Lt, Pt) 6∈ Ct.
As a simple example, the final stage cost
gT (cT , LT ) =
{
0 LT = 0,
∞ LT 6= 0,
imposes the constraint that the sequence of payments must result in all liabilities cleared
at the end of the time horizon. Here gT is the indicator function of the constraint LT = 0.
(The indicator function of a constraint has the value 0 when the constraint is satisfied, and
+∞ when it is violated.)
The liability control problem has the form
minimize
∑T−1
t=1 gt(ct, Lt, Pt) + gT (cT , LT )
subject to Lt+1 = Lt − Pt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
ct+1 = ct − Pt1 + P Tt 1, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Pt1 ≤ ct, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Pt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Lt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T,
c1 = c
init, L1 = L
init, cT ≥ 0,
(8)
with variables ct, Lt, t = 1, . . . , T , and Pt, t = 1, . . . , T −1. (The constraint ct ≥ 0 is implied
by Pt1 ≤ ct.) We refer to this as the liability clearing control problem. It is specified by the
stage cost functions g1, . . . , gT , the initial liability matrix L
init, and the initial cash vector
cinit. We observe that the last four sets of inequality constraints could be absorbed into the
stage cost functions gt and gT ; for clarity we include them in (8) explicitly.
Convexity. We will make the assumption that the stage cost functions gt and gT are
convex, which implies that the liability control problem (8) is a convex optimization prob-
lem [BV04]. This implies that it can be (globally) solved efficiently, even at large scale; this
is discussed further in §4.4. Perhaps more important from a practical point of view is that
it can be solved with near total reliability, with no human intervention, and at high speed if
needed.
We make the assumption not just because of the computational advantages that convexity
confers, but also because there are very reasonable choices of the cost functions that satisfy
the convexity assumption. It is also true that some reasonable cost functions are not convex;
we give an example in §7.5.
4.2 Constraints
In this section we describe some examples of useful constraints, which can be combined with
each other or any of the cost functions described below. They are all convex.
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Liability clearance. We can constrain the liabilities to be fully cleared at time T with
the constraint
LT = 0.
If w1 6≥ 0 or the liabilities cannot be cleared in time, the liability clearing problem (8) with
this constraint will be infeasible.
Pro-rata constraint. The proportional liability of each entity is the proportion of its
total liability that it owes to the other entities, which for entity i is (Lt)i/(Lt1)i. We can
constrain the final proportional liability of each entity to be equal to the initial proportional
liability with the linear constraint
diag(L11)LT = diag(LT1)L1,
where diag(x) is the diagonal matrix with x on its diagonal. This constraint also holds if
LT = 0, i.e., the sequence of payments clears all liabilities.
Cash minimums. Cash minimums, represented by the vector cmin ∈ Rn+, where (cmin)i is
the minimum cash that the entity i is allowed to hold, can be enforced with the constraint
ct ≥ cmin, t = 1, . . . , T.
Cash minimums can arise for a number of reasons, one of them being reserve requirements
for banks [Boa20].
Payment maximums. We can constrain the payment between entities to be below some
maximum payment Pmax ∈ Rn×n+ , where (Pmax)ij is the maximum allowable payment from
entity i to entity j, with the constraint
Pt ≤ Pmax, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
We can impose a limit on how much cash each entity uses for payments with the constraint
Pt1 ≤ βct, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
where 0 < β ≤ 1 is the fraction of the entity’s cash that can be used to make payments in
each time period.
Payment deadlines. Deadlines on payments are represented by the set
Ω ⊆ {1, . . . , T} × {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}.
If (t, i, j) ∈ Ω, we require that the liability between entities i and j becomes zero at time t.
This results in the constraints (Lt)ij = 0 for all (t, i, j) ∈ Ω.
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Progress milestones. We can impose the constraint that the liabilities are reduced by
the fraction η ∈ (0, 1) in τ time periods, with Lτ ≤ ηL1.
4.3 Costs
In this section we list some interesting and useful convex stage costs. We note that any
combination of the constraints above can be included with any combination of the costs
listed below, by adding their indicator functions to the cost.
Weighted total gross liability. A simple and useful stage cost is a weighted total gross
liability,
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = Tr(C
TLt) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Cij(Lt)ij, (9)
where the matrix C ∈ Rn×n+ represents the (marginal) cost of each liability. When C = 11T
(i.e., Cij = 1 for all i and j), this stage cost is simply the total gross liability 1
TLt1 at time t.
When C is not the all ones matrix, it encourages reducing liabilities Lij with higher weights
Cij.
Total squared gross payment. Another simple and useful stage cost is the total squared
gross payment,
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = Tr(D
TP 2t ) =
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
Dij(Pt)
2
ij,
where D ∈ Rn×n+ represents the cost of each squared payment, and the square is taken
elementwise. This stage cost is meant to reduce the size of payments made between entities.
As a result of the super-linearity of the square function, it is more sensitive to large payments
between the entities than smaller ones. In control terms, the sum of squared payments is our
control effort, which we would like to be small. It is a traditional term in optimal control.
Distance from cash to net worth. If the liability is cleared, i.e., Lt = 0, then the cash
held by each entity will be equal to its net worth, or ct = wt. We can penalize the distance
from the cash held by each entity to its net worth with, e.g., the cost function
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = ‖ct − w1‖22.
If we want to make ct exactly equal to w1 in as many entries as possible as quickly as possible,
we can replace the cost above with the `1 norm ‖ct − w1‖1.
Time-weighted stage cost. Any of these stage costs can be time-weighted. That is, if
the stage cost is time-invariant, i.e., gt = g for some stage cost g, the time-weighted stage
cost is
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = γ
t−1g(ct, Lt, Pt),
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where γ > 0. For γ > 1, this stage cost preferentially rewards the stage cost being decreased
later (i.e., for large t); for γ < 1, it represents a traditional discount factor, which preferen-
tially rewards the stage cost being decreased earlier (i.e., for small t). With γ = 1, we treat
stage costs at different time periods the same.
4.4 Computational efficiency
Since problem (8) is a convex optimization problem, it can be solved efficiently [BV04], even
for very large problem sizes. The number of variables and constraints in the problem is on the
order Tn2. However, this convex optimization problem is often very sparse. The inequalities
(4) and (5) imply that Lt and Pt can only have nonzero entries where L
init does. This means
that the number of variables can be reduced to order Tnnz(Linit) variables, where nnz(Linit)
is the number of nonzero entries in the initial liability matrix. (In appendix A, we give an
alternative formulation of the liability clearing control problem that exploits this sparsity
preserving property.) Due to the block-banded nature of the optimal control problem, the
computational complexity grows linearly in T ; see, e.g., [BV04, §A.3].
As a practical matter, we can easily solve the liability clearing problem with n = 1000
entities, nnz(Linit) = 5000, and T = 20, using generic methods running on an Intel i7-8700K
CPU, in under a minute. Small problems, with say n = 10 entities, nnz(Linit) = 30, and
T = 20 can be solved in under a millisecond, using techniques of code generation such as
CVXGEN [MB09, MB12].
It is very easy to express the liability clearing control problem using domain specific
languages for convex optimization, such as CVX [GB08, GB14], YALMIP [Lof04], CVXPY
[DB16, AVDB18], Convex.jl [UMZ+14], and CVXR [FNB19]. These languages make it easy
to rapidly prototype and experiment with different cost functions and constraints. In each
of these languages, the liability control problem can be specified in just a few tens of lines
of very clear and transparent code.
4.5 Pro-rata baseline method
We describe here a simple and intuitive scheme for determining cash payments P1, . . . , PT−1.
We will use this as a baseline method to compare against the optimal control method de-
scribed above.
The payment Pt is determined as follows. At each time step, each entity pays as much
as possible pro-rata, i.e., in proportion to how much it owes the other entities, up to its
liability. Define the liability proportion matrix as
Π = diag(1/(Linit1))Linit,
so (Π)ij is the fraction of entity i’s total liability that it owes to entity j. The pro-rata
baseline has the form
Pt = min(diag(ct)Π, Lt), (10)
where min is taken elementwise. We will see that the (seemingly sensible) pro-rata baseline
is not an efficient strategy for optimally clearing liabilities.
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5 Liability control with exogenous unknown inputs
In this section we extend the optimal control formulation in §4 to handle additional (exoge-
nous) terms in the liability and cash dynamics, unrelated to the clearing process and pay-
ments. When these additional terms are known, we obtain a straightforward generalization
of the liability clearing control problem, with a few extra terms in the dynamics equations.
For the case when they are not known ahead of time, we propose a standard method called
model predictive control (MPC), or shrinking horizon control [Bem06, RM09, MWB11].
MPC has been used successfully in a wide variety of applications, for example, in supply
chain management [CTHK03], finance [BBD+17], automatic control [FBA+07, BAS10], and
energy management [MBH+11, SWBB11, MBBW19]. It has been observed to work well
even when the forecasts are not particularly good [WB09, §4].
5.1 Optimal control with exogenous inputs
We replace the dynamics equations (2) and (3) with
Lt+1 = Lt − Pt +Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (11)
ct+1 = ct − Pt1 + P Tt 1 + wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (12)
where Wt ∈ Rn×n is the liability adjustment at time t, and wt ∈ Rn is the exogenous cash
flow at time t. The liability adjustment Wt can originate from entities creating new liability
agreements; the cash flow wt can originate from payments received or made by an entity,
unrelated to clearing liabilities. The terms Wt and wt are exogenous inputs in our dynamics,
i.e., additional terms that affect the liabilities and cash, but are outside our control (at least,
for the problem of clearing liabilities). The cash on hand constraint (1) is modified to be
Pt1 ≤ ct + wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1, (13)
where ct + wt is the cash on hand after the exogenous cash flow.
When the exogenous inputs are known (which might occur, for example, when all the
exogenous cash flows and liability updates are planned or scheduled), we obtain a straight-
forward generalization of the liability clearing control problem,
minimize
∑T−1
t=1 gt(ct, Lt, Pt) + gT (cT , LT )
subject to Lt+1 = Lt − Pt +Wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
ct+1 = ct − Pt1 + P Tt 1 + wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Pt1 ≤ ct + wt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Pt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
ct ≥ 0, Lt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T,
c1 = c
init, L1 = L
init,
(14)
with variables ct, Lt, and Pt.
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5.2 Optimal control with unknown exogenous inputs
We now consider a more common case, where wt and Wt are not known, or not fully known,
when the sequence of payments is chosen. It would be impossible to choose the payment
in time period t without knowing wt; otherwise we cannot be sure to satisfy (13). For this
reason we assume that Wt and wt are known at time period t, and therefore can be used
when we choose the payment Pt. (An alternative interpretation is that the exogenous cash
arrives before we make payments in period t.) Thus at time period t, when Pt is chosen, we
assume that w1, . . . , wt and W1, . . . ,Wt are all known.
Forecasts. At time period t, we do not know wt+1, . . . , wT−1 or Wt+1, . . . ,WT−1. Instead
we use forecasts of these quantities, which we denote by
wˆτ |t, Wˆτ |t, τ = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1.
We interpret the subscript τ |t as meaning our forecast of the quantity at time period τ ,
made at time period t. These forecasts can range from sophisticated ones based on machine
learning to very simple ones, like wˆτ |t = 0, Wˆτ |t = 0, i.e., we predict that there will be no
future adjustments to the cash or liabilities. We will take wˆτ |t = wτ and Wˆτ |t = Wτ for
τ ≤ t; that is, our ‘forecasts’ for the current and earlier times are simply the values that
were observed.
Shrinking horizon policy. We now describe a common heuristic for choosing Pt at time
period t, called MPC. The idea is very simple: we solve the problem (14), over the remaining
horizon from time periods t to T , replacing the unknown quantities with forecasts. That is,
we solve the problem
minimize
∑T−1
τ=t gτ (cτ , Lτ , Pτ ) + gT (cT , LT )
subject to Lτ+1 = Lτ − Pτ + Wˆτ |t, τ = t, . . . , T − 1,
cτ+1 = cτ − Pτ1 + P Tτ 1 + wˆτ |t, τ = t, . . . , T − 1,
Pτ1 ≤ cτ + wτ , τ = t, . . . , T − 1,
Pτ ≥ 0, τ = t, . . . , T − 1,
cτ ≥ 0, Lτ ≥ 0, τ = t, . . . , T,
(15)
with variables ct+1, . . . , cT , Lt+1, . . . , LT , and Pt, . . . , PT−1. In (15), ct and Lt are known;
they are not variables, and we take Wˆt|t = Wt and wˆt|t = wt, which are known. We can
interpret the solution of (15) as a plan of action from time period t to T .
We choose Pt as the value of Pt that is a solution of (15). Thus, at time period t we plan
a sequence of payments (by solving (15)); then we act by actually making the payments in
the first step of our plan. MPC has been observed to perform well in many applications,
even when the forecasts are not particularly good, or simplistic (e.g., zero).
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Pro-rata baseline policy. We observe that the pro-rata baseline payments (10) are read-
ily extended to the case when we have exogenous inputs, with wt and Wt known at time
period t. First, we define the liability proportion matrix at time t as
Πt = diag(1/L
run
t )L
run
t ,
where Lrunt = L
init +
∑t
τ=1Wτ is the running sum of liabilities. The pro-rata baseline policy
then has the form
Pt = min(diag(ct + wt)Πt, Lt +Wt). (16)
6 Examples
The code for all of these examples has been made available online at
www.github.com/cvxgrp/multi_period_liability_clearing.
We use CVXPY [DB16, AVDB18] to formulate the problems and solve them with MOSEK
[aps20].
Initial liability matrix. We use the same initial liability matrix Linit for each example,
with n = 200 entities. We choose the sparsity pattern of Linit as 2000 random off-diagonal
entries (so on average, each entity has an initial liability to 10 others). The nonzero entries
of Linit are then sampled independently from a standard log-normal distribution. While we
report results below for this one problem instance, numerical experiments with a wide variety
of other instances show that the results are qualitatively similar. We note that our example
is purely illustrative, and that further experimentation needs to be performed on problem
instances that bear more structural similarity to real world financial networks [BEST04].
6.1 Liability clearing
We consider the problem of clearing liabilities over T = 10 time steps, i.e., we have the
constraint that the final liabilities are cleared, LT = 0. We set the initial cash to the
minimum nonnegative cash required so each entity has nonnegative net worth, or
cinit = max(Linit1− (Linit)T1, 0),
where max is meant elementwise.
Total gross liability. The first stage cost function we consider is
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = 1
TLt1,
the total gross liability at each time t. We compare the solution to the liability control
problem (8) using this stage cost function with the pro-rata baseline method described in
§4.5. The total gross liability and the number of non-cleared liabilities at each step of both
sequences of payments are shown in figure 1. The optimal sequence of payments clears the
liabilities by t = 5, while the baseline clears them by t = 8.
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Figure 1: Minimizing the sum of total gross liabilities. The solid line is the optimal payment
schedule. The dashed line is the pro-rata baseline method.
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Figure 2: Minimizing the sum of risk-weighted liabilities. The solid line is the optimal
payment schedule. The dashed line is the pro-rata baseline method.
Risk-weighted liability. Suppose we believe that the risk of each entity is proportional
to r = exp(−w1), where exp is taken elementwise, i.e., higher net worth implies lower risk.
A reasonable stage cost function is then risk-weighted liability
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = 1
TLtr.
This stage cost encourages clearing the liabilities for high risk entities before low risk entities.
We compare the solution to the liability control problem (8) using this stage cost function
with the pro-rata baseline method in §4.5. The total gross liability and the number of non-
cleared liabilities at each step of both sequences of payments are shown in figure 2. We
observe that the liabilities are still cleared by t = 5, but the liabilities are much sparser,
since the liabilities of high risk entities are cleared before those of low risk entities. We also
note that the optimal payment sequence is much faster at reducing risk than the baseline.
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Figure 3: Minimizing the sum of total gross liability plus total squared gross payment for
various values of λ.
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Figure 4: Liability reduction example.
Total squared gross payment. To the total gross liability stage cost above, we add the
total squared payments, resulting in the stage cost
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = 1
TLt1 + λ1
TP 2t 1,
where λ > 0 is a parameter. This choice of stage cost penalizes large payments, and stretches
the liability clearing over a longer period of time. (We retain, however, the liability clearing
constraint LT = 0.) We plot the optimal total gross liability and the total squared gross
payment for various values of λ in figure 3. (We do not compare to the pro-rata baseline
because it does not seek to make payments small.)
6.2 Liability reduction
Suppose that some entities have negative initial net worth. This means that we will not be
able to clear all of the liabilities; our goal is then to reduce the liabilities as much as possible,
subject to the pro-rata constraint diag(Linit1)LT = diag(LT1)L
init. We consider the same
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Figure 5: Liability control with exogenous inputs.
liability matrix as §6.1, but change the initial cash to
c1 = max(L
init1− (Linit)T1 + z, 0), zi ∼ U(−5, 5), i = 1, . . . , n, (17)
where U(−5, 5) is the uniform distribution on [−5, 5], which in our case leads to 49 entities
with negative net worth. We consider the stage costs
gt(ct, Lt, Pt) =
{
1TLt1 Pt1 ≤ ct/2,
+∞ otherwise, gT (cT , LT ) = 1
TLT1.
The stage cost is the total gross liability, plus the indicator function of the constraint that
each entity pays out no more than half of its available cash in each time period. We adjust
the pro-rata baseline to
Pt = min(diag(ct/2)Π, Lt),
so that each entity pays no more than half its available cash, and increase the time horizon
to T = 20. The results are displayed in figure 4. The optimal scheme is able to reduce the
liabilities faster than the baseline; both methods clear all but around 350 of the original 2000
liabilities. (In §7.5 we will see an extension that directly includes the number of non-cleared
liabilities in the stage cost.)
6.3 Exogenous unknown inputs
Next we consider the case where there are exogenous unknown inputs to the dynamics. The
cash flows and change in liabilities are sampled according to
wt = z1, (Wt)ij =
{
z2/10 (L
init)ij > 0,
0 otherwise,
t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
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where log(z1) ∼ N (0, I) and log(z2) ∼ N (0, 1). At each time step t, we use the mean of the
future inputs as the forecast, or
wˆτ |t = e1/21, Wˆτ |t =
{
e1/2/10 (Linit)ij > 0,
0 otherwise,
τ = t+ 1, . . . , T − 1.
We sample the initial cash vector according to
c1 = max(L
init1− (Linit)T1 + z, 0), zi ∼ U(−5, 0), i = 1, . . . , n.
We use the stage cost function gt(ct, Lt, Pt) = 1
TLt1 and the MPC policy described in §5.2.
We compared the shrinking horizon MPC policy with the (modified) pro-rata baseline policy
described in §5.2. The results are displayed in figure 5; note that the total gross liability
appears to reach a statistical steady state and the liabilities can never be fully cleared. The
MPC policy appears to be better than the baseline at reducing liabilities.
7 Extensions and variations
In this section we mention some extensions and variations on the formulations described
above.
7.1 Bailouts
We can add an additional term to the dynamics that injects cash into the entities at various
times, with presumably very high cost in the objective. With a linear objective term with
sufficiently high weight, the bailout cash injections are zero, if it is possible to clear the
liabilities without cash injection. We note that bailouts have been considered in [CC15,
§2.2].
7.2 Minimum time to clear liabilities
Instead of the time-separable cost function given in (8), we take as the objective the number
of steps needed to clear all liabilities. That is, our objective is T clr, defined as the minimum
value of t for which Lt = 0 is feasible. It is easily shown that T
clr is a quasi-convex function
of the liability sequence L1, . . . , LT [BV04, §4.2.5], so this problem is readily solved using
bisection, solving no more than log2 T convex problems. If the liabilities cannot be cleared
in up to T steps then we can find a T such that they can be cleared using the techniques
described in [AB20, §3].
7.3 Non-time-separable cost
The cost function in our basic formulation (8) is separable, i.e., a sum of terms for each
t = 1, . . . , T . This can be extended to include non-separable cost functions. We describe a
few of these below. They are convex, but non-convex versions of the same objectives can
also be employed, at the cost of computational efficiency to solve the problem globally.
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Smooth payments. Adding the term
∑T−1
t=2 ‖Pt − Pt−1‖2F to the cost, where ‖A‖F is the
Frobenius norm, i.e., the square root of the sum of the squared entries of A, causes smooth
transitions in the payment matrix. This cost is sometimes called the Dirichlet energy [BV18,
§7.3] or a Laplacian regularization term [BLM90].
Piecewise constant payments. Adding the term
∑T−1
t=2 ‖Pt − Pt−1‖1, where ‖A‖1 is the
sum of absolute values of the entries of A, to the cost encourages the payment matrix to
change in as few entries as possible between time steps. This cost is sometimes called the
total variation penalty [ROF92].
Global payment restructuring. Adding the term
∑T−1
t=2 ‖Pt − Pt−1‖F to the cost en-
courages the entire payment matrix to change at as few time steps as possible [DWW14].
Per-entity payment restructuring. Adding the term
∑T−1
t=2
∑n
i=1 ‖P Tt ei−P Tt−1ei‖2, where
ei is the ith unit vector, to the cost encourages the rows of the payment matrix, i.e., the
payments made by each entity, to change at as few time steps as possible. This penalty is
sometimes called a group lasso penalty [YL06].
7.4 Infinite time liability control
In §5.2 we described what is often called shrinking horizon control, because at time period
t, we solve for a sequence of payments Pt, . . . , PT−1 over the remaining horizon; the number
of payments we optimize over (i.e., T − t) shrinks as t increases. This formulation assumes
there is a fixed horizon T .
It is also possible to consider a formulation with no fixed horizon T ; the liability clearing
is done over periods t = 1, 2, . . . without end. The exogenous inputs wt and Wt also con-
tinue without end. Since we have exogenous inputs, we will generally not be able to clear
the liabilities; our goal is only to keep the liabilities small, while making if possible small
payments. In this case we have a traditional infinite horizon control or regulator problem.
In economics terms, this is an equilibrium payment scheme.
The MPC formulation is readily extended to this case, and is sometimes called receding
horizon control (RHC), since we are always planning out T steps from the current time
t. It is common to add a clearing constraint at the horizon in infinite time MPC or RHC
formulations [RM09, §2.2].
7.5 Minimizing the number of non-cleared liabilities
Another reasonable objective to consider is the number of non-cleared (i.e., remaining)
liabilities. In this case, the only cost is the number of nonzero entries in LT . This problem
is non-convex, but it can be readily formulated as a mixed-integer convex program (MICP),
and solved, albeit slowly, using standard MICP techniques such as branch-and-bound [LD60].
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It can also be approximately solved much quicker using heuristics, such as iterative weighted
`1-minimization [CWB08].
As a numerical example, we consider a smaller version of the initial liability matrix used
in §6, with n = 40 and 400 nonzero initial liabilities. We sample the initial cash according
to (17), so that the liabilities cannot be fully cleared, and use a time horizon T = 10.
Minimizing the sum of total gross liabilities takes 0.05 seconds, resulting in 46 non-cleared
liabilities and a final total gross liability of 22.52. By contrast, minimizing the number of
non-cleared liabilities takes 22.93 seconds, resulting in only 10 non-cleared liabilities and a
final total gross liability of 29.78. (The increase in computation time of a mixed-integer
convex optimal control problem, compared to a convex optimal control problem of the same
size, increases rapidly with problem size.)
As an extension of minimizing the number of non-cleared liabilities, we can consider
minimizing the number of non-cleared entities. If the ith row of Lt is zero, it means that
entity i does not owe anything to the others, and we say this entity is cleared. We can
easily add the number of non-cleared entities to our stage cost, using a mixed-integer convex
formulation.
7.6 Distributed algorithm
As stated, the liability control problem (8) requires global coordination, i.e., full knowledge of
the cash held and the liabilities between the entities throughout the optimization procedure.
In many settings where cash, liabilities, or payments cannot be publicly disclosed, this is not
possible.
It is possible to solve the liability control problem in a distributed manner where each
entity only knows its cash and the payments and liabilities it is involved in during the
optimization procedure. That is, entity i only needs to know (ct)i, the ith row and column
of Lt, and the ith row and column of Pt.
We can do this by adding a variable P˜t ∈ Rn×n+ , the constraint P˜t = P Tt , t = 1, . . . , T ,
and replacing the cash dynamics (3) with
ct+1 = ct − Pt1 + P˜t1, t = 1, . . . , T − 1.
Then, by applying the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) to the splitting
(ct, Lt, Pt) and P˜t, we arrive at a distributed algorithm for the problem [BPC
+11]. Each
iteration of the algorithm involves three steps; 1) each entity solves a separate control problem
to compute their cash, outbound liabilities, and outbound payments; 2) each entity solves a
separate least squares problem that depends on their inbound payments; and 3) each entity
performs a separate dual variable update. When the stage cost is convex, this algorithm
is guaranteed to converge to a (global) solution [BPC+11, Appendix A]. Each step of the
algorithm only requires coordination between entities connected in the liability graph, and
hence preserves some level of privacy. Similar ideas have been used to develop distributed
privacy-preserving implementations of predictive patient models across hospitals [JDVS+16]
and energy management across microgrid systems [LGX17].
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A Sparsity preserving formulation
In this section we describe a sparsity-preserving formulation of problem (8). We make use
of the fact that Lt and Pt are at least as sparse as L
init (see §3).
First, let m = nnz(Linit) and Ik ∈ {1, . . . , n} × {1, . . . , n}, k = 1, . . . ,m, be the sparsity
pattern of Linit, meaning (Linit)ij = 0 for all (i, j) 6∈ Ik, k = 1, . . . ,m. Instead of working
with the matrix variables Lt and Pt, we work with the vector variables lt ∈ Rm+ and pt ∈ Rm+ ,
which represent the nonzero entries of Lt and Pt (in the same order). That is,
(lt)k = (Lt)ij, (pt)k = (Pt)ij, (i, j) = Ik, k = 1, . . . ,m.
The initial liability is given by linit ∈ Rm+ , which contains the nonzero entries of Linit. The
sparsity preserving formulation of the optimal control problem (8) has the form
minimize
∑T−1
t=1 gt(ct, lt, pt) + gT (cT , lT )
subject to lt+1 = lt − pt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
ct+1 = ct − Srowpt + Scolpt, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
Srowpt ≤ ct, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
pt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T − 1,
lt ≥ 0, t = 1, . . . , T,
c1 = c
init, l1 = l
init, cT ≥ 0,
(18)
where Srow ∈ Rn×m sums the rows of Pt, i.e., Srowpt = Pt1, and Scol ∈ Rn×m sums the
columns of Pt, i.e., S
colpt = P
T
t 1. The cost functions are applied only to the nonzero entries
of Lt and Pt, so they take the form gt : R
n
+×Rm+ ×Rm+ → R∪ {+∞} and gT : Rn+×Rm+ →
R ∪ {+∞}. Problem (18) has just 2T (n+m) variables, which can be much fewer than the
original 2T (n+ n2) variables when m n2.
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